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CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES h::l\·e pl~,·ed" ~ccondan· role in e~ch imt;tnce.' Reflecting Sm·iet and \\'estern influence. the jural model st~nd~ for formal. elaborate, and codified rules enforced by ~ centr·alized and in-;titution~lized bureaunacv. The societal model, on the othet· hand. focuses on sociallv apprcl\'ed norms ~nd ,·alues, implemented bv political socialization and enforced by social pressures.
Although labelled the Communist Chinese equi\'alent of Confucian Li, the informal model represents a distinctly :\hoist approach to law. The proper modes of conduct based on the collecti\'e ethics of an egalitarian societ,· are communicated to the people through education and mass participation in the political-legal process. Compliance is secured by the individual's internalization of social norms and bv community pressure and coercion. The formal sanctioning p1·ocess of the state comes into play only in serious cases of de\'iance.
Because of his anti-bureaucratic bias and mass-line orientation, Mao preferred informalit)' and flexibility in handling political and legal issues.
• While recognizing the need for a legal system in a society, he nevertheless considered law merely as a useful tool to political ends and would not let formal rules and procedures hinder the interest of the revolution. As early as 1926, he articulated his mass revolutionary method by saying that "proper limits have to 7 For a discussion of law in traditional China, see D. BoDDS & C. ~foRRIS, LAw IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967) ; CHu TUNG-TSU, LAw AND SociETY IN TRADI-TIONAL CHINA (1961) ; S. VAN DER SPRENKEL. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MAINLAND CHINA (1962) . ' The mass line is a fundamental Party principle of leadership, expounded by Mao, requiring party cadres to be integrated with the masses and to lead the masses in implementing the Parry's policy. Epitomized by the phrase "from the masses, to the masses," it prescribes a process of learning the masses' views, "concentrating" them into policy decisions, and bringing those decisions back to the masses for implementation. Mao Tse-tung, So1TU' Qutstio11.1 Conarning Method• of Ltadtnhip, 3 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TsE-TUNG 117-22 (1967) . In terms of work style, the mass line embodies the ~faoist preference for mobilizing mass participation in policy execution through nongovernmental organization and activities. The emphasi> is un direct popular .tction rather than bureaucratic administration. for a good discussion of the mass line, see J. LEWIS, LEADERSHIP IN CoM-MUNIST CHINA, 70-100 (1964) ; j. TOWNSEND, POLITI· CAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMt:NIST CHINA 72-74 ( 1967) . Luhman, .\tao and Mtdiatior.: Polltir.1 ""d Di. •-putt Rt1olution m Commum.<t China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1303-05 (1967) . be e'ceeded in order to right a 11 rong-, or else the wrong cannot be righted."" During the Kiangsi So,·iet period of 1931-1934, the Chinese So,·iet Republic under the direction of the \lo~co11·-oriemed "returned ~tudents group" enacted a number of basic laws and established a svstem of "people's courts" including some elaborate judicial proredu1·es.'" :\s the Kuomintang threat increased in 1933, both :\.lao Tsetung and Chang Wen-t'ien maintained that local authorities should ha,·e more freedom and power in dealing with counter re\'olutionaries. Chang expressed this \'iew in an essav ad\'ising judicial cadres not tn be concerned with the "niceties of legal procedures and pro-,·isions" but with the "creation of our laws according to revolutionary needs in the course of brutal class struggle."" During the Yenan period, when the Chinese Communist Partv was under \lao's undisputed leadership, there appeared, on the one hand, a tendency in the Communist-held area to regularize the judicial structure and process. On ihc other hand, there were mo,·es to refine and popularize mass line techniques in applying sanctions and settling disputes. These techniques included on-the-spot trials and mass trials to mobilize and educate the masse' and also the development of mediation as an effecti\'e means for resoh·ing civil and minor criminal cases."
In the vears immediately following the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, the dual models of law continued to operate in a complememarv yet competiti,·e manner. A uniform, qation-wide court system was being developed along with t.he promulgation of such statutes as the Land Reform Law and the :\larriage Law. At the same time, justice was often carried out by ad hoc people's tribunals, mass trials, or public security organs (the police) in the form of large scale political 9 Report on the Investigation of the PtasaTlt Movtmmt.
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campaigmY .-\s China adopred !he Sm iet 'I\ le of economic develupmem in 1953, !here w ;,, a general swing wward insriruriunalizauon and bureaucraric normalizarion. In whar m"' be talled rhe era of rhe PRC ', consriruriunal experimem, 1954-195i , rhe ascendenn of rhc jural model was marked by rhe adoprion of a comrirurion, m·ganit legislariun for rhe courl' and procuracv, and a series of subsrami,·e and procedural laws and regulations. Equaliry before the law, the right of legal defense, proteniun against arbitrary arrest, and independence of the judiciary were guaranteed by the Constitution and other documents. Efforts were also made to draft civil, criminal, and procedural codes.
14 It is true that even in this period there was a continued informalization and politicization of the legal work." But an important trend was started toward more regularity ami institutionahzation. At the Eighth National CongreS> of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i, then Vice
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, spoke of the reasons for regularizing the legal system. He said, "now . . . the period of revolutionary storm and stress is past, new relations of production have been set up, and the aim of our struggle is changed into one of safeguarding the successful development of the productive forces of society; a corresponding change in the methods of struggle will consequently have to follow. and a complete legal system becomes an absolute necessity." 16 Similarly, the speech given by Tung Pi-wu, then President of the Supreme 13 The Land Reform Three-Anii, Five-Anti, and Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movements were among those nation-wide mass campaign ' launched during [1950] [1951] [1952] . Ste LENG, ;upra note 6, at [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] ; upra note 6, " For details of rhe PRC's consrirutional experiment in rhe 1950's, see COHEN, supra 1101e 6. ar 10-14: LENG, supra note 6, at 47-54: TAO-TAl HsiA, GvmE TO SELECTED SouRcEs or MAI!'ILAND CHINA 1-76 (1967) . English text of the 1954 Constitution is in CoNSTITt!TION of THE PEOPLE's REPUBLIC: Of CHI"A (1954) . Anides 73 to 103 contained provisio11s for the courts, procuracy and rights of the people.
,. Cohen. Tht Chine~e Comm:.tni.<t Part\ and judznal Jndtpmdmre: 1949 -1959 , 82 HARV. L. Rfv. 96i (1969 : Li, supra note 6, at 80-88: Lubman, ;upra note 6, at 546-51.
16 Liu Shao-ch"i. People's Coun. ;md the re,olutt<Jll ~doptt"d ll\ the Central Committee «l the Ei).(hlh Con"""" emphasized the need fur codification ;md lor observance of rhe law 17 :\lao he-tung, ne\er-thele" . .tppeared to be le" enthu,i.t'll<. !11 l11' speech before the same Congress he 1\arnt>d his party of the evil of bureaun . .Hism and th1:0 danger of becoming isulatt>d ft om the ma,".-'·'" China·, progress toward a stable legal order came to an abrupt end in 195i when the Communist elites launched an Anti-Rightist campaign as a counter attack against strong criticisms of the Party evoked by the Hundred Flowers !\lovement. 19 Even more far-reaching was the PRC's decision to abandon the Sm iet model in favor of the :\1aoist developmt·ntal strategy (the Great Leap Forward) that stre"ed mas• mobilization and "politics in command."'" The impact on the legal field was a decisin~ shift from the jural model to the societal model. Dlll·ing the retrenchmelll ye.ll' of the early 1960's, when Liu Shao-ch'i was the head of state, there was an occasional reappearance of legal discussions in juridical circles. . 464-500 (1968) . " For instance, in the early 1960"• legal forums were held. and books and articles were written on such subjects as '"philosophv of l.1w :· ··,rate and I ega I theories,'" '"histon of Chinese law," etc. 1 he 196\i issues of chen-fa· yen-chiu (Politiral-legal \tudie,), Peking [hereinafter cited a• C.F.Y.C.] in particular.
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CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES whole. hm,·e,·er. the post 1957 trend C•1ntinued to >how the decline of the judiciary and procuracv in importance and the e,·er-expanding role of Parn· committees and public o;ecuril\· organs in Ia"· enforcement!'
The jural model suffered another serious setback during the Cultural Remlution . The Cultural Revolution ,,·as initiated hv \lao largelv to revolutionalize the bureaucratic establishment and to inculcate socialist values and beliefs. One of the targets under attack was the existing legal structure, which the Red Guards labelled as a counterrevolutionary creation of Liu Shao-ch'i and his fellow "capitalist roaders." Among others, the :1.1aoists criticized Liu's group for supporting the "bourgeois" systems of"equaljustice" and "defense counsel" and for resisting "leadership of the Partv m·er legal work."
23 Following :l.fao's instruction to "smash Kung-chien-fu (Police. procurac~·, and courts)," the Red Guards singled 0111 tl:e public security for special denouncement. 24 The latter contained many serious ~nicles on legal questions. In an editorial titled "In Praise of Ltwlessne,s.'' the People'.< Daih called for the complete destruction of the "bourgeois" Ia"· so that the proletarian leg.tl order could he established."" To Jchieve the transformation of politicallegal organs. \lao proceeded to have a large number of cadres purged without resort to am· formal process. Among many law enforcement personnel removed from office were Yang Hsiu-feng. President of the Supreme People's Court, Chang Ting-cheng, the Chief Procurator. and Hsiu Tzu-jung. the First Deputy Min-;ster of Public Securit\ . 27 Liu Shao-ch'i, the primJrv target of the Cnltural Revolution, was deprived of his post as the Chairman of the People's Republic of China hv the decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in disregard of constitutional procedure-""
The reform of the law enforcement apparatus during the Cultural Revolution was also accomplished through the wider use of mass line devices and the imposition of militarv control over "Kung-chien-b" by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).'" The court' >till existed 25 Comrade Hsieh Fu-clueh Important Speech (excerpts), Canton Chiu-P'eng-Lo Chan-Po (Drag-out P'eng-Lo Combat :-:ews), (:'\o. 3, Feb. 1968) in S.C.~LP. 5-i (:'\o. 4138, 1968) ; Suppmsion of the .WaSJes is Bourgeois Dictatorship, Shanghai Wen-hui Pao,june 5, 1968 , in S.C.:\LP., 1-7 (:'\o. 4210, 1968 iment, 1954-195i . the ascendenn of the jural model was marked by the adoption of a um,titution, org.Init legislation for the court' and procuracy. and a series of substanti,·e and procedural laws and regulations. Equalit) before the law. the right of legal defense. protection against arbitrary arrest, and independence of the judiciary were guaranteed by the Constitution and other documents. Efforts were also made to draft civil. criminal, and procedural codes.
14 It is true that even in this pel'iod the1·e was a continued informalization and politicization of the legal work." But an important trend was started toward more regularit) and institutiun.llization. At the Eighth !':ational Congres' of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1956, Liu Shao-ch'i, then Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, spoke of the reasons for regularizing the legal system. He said, "now . . . the period of revolutionary storm and stress is past, new relations of production have been set up, and the aim of our struggle is changed into one of safeguarding the suLcessful development of the productive forces of society; a corresponding change in the methods of struggle will consequently have to follow, and a complete legal system becomes an absolute necessity ." 16 Similarly, the speech given h) Tung Pi-wu, then President of the Supreme 13 The Land Reform Three-Anii, Five-Anti, and Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movements were among those nation-wide mass campaign' launched during 1950-1952. See LENG, ,upra note 6, at 35-39 and Tao, 'upra note 6, at 715-20. " For details of the PRC's constitutional experiment in the 1950's, see COHEN. supra note 6, at 10-14; LENG, supra note 6, at 47-54; TAO-TAl HsiA, G!!IDE To SELEcTED SouRcEs OF MAI>~LAND CHINA 1-76 (1967 CHI>IA 256-340 (1970) ; F. SHI!RMA""· IOlOI OGY A"[) 0Rf'ANIZATION 1" CoMMt:siST CHINA. 464-500 ( 1968) .
" For instance. in the early 196<fs legal forums were held. and books and articles were written on such subjects as "philosophY of law," "state and legal theorie,," "history of Chinese law:· etc. 1 h<' l%l! issues of chen-fa \en-chiu (Politi<-al-legal 'tudie,), P<"king (he•·einafte; cnerl as C.F.Y .C.] in panirular.
CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES whole. howe,er. the post 1957 trend cmuinued to show the decline of the judiciary and procurarv in importance and the ever-expanding role of Pan,· committees and public 'ecuritv organs in law enforcement."'
The jural model suffered another serious setback during the Cultural Remlution . The Cultural Revolution was initiated bv :\-lao largely to re,·olutionalize the bureaucratic establishment and to inculcate socialist \'alues and beliefs. One of the targets under attack was the existing legal structure. which the Red Guards labelled as a counterrevolutionary creation of Liu Shao-ch'i and his fellow "capitalist roaders." Among others, the \1aoists criticized Liu's group for supporting the "bourgeois" systems of"equaljustice" and "defense counsel" and for resisting "leadership nf the Partv oYer legal work.""' Following :'vfao's instruction to "smash Kung-chien-fu (Police. procurac~·, and courts)." the Red Guards singled out tl:e public security for special denouncement. The reform of the law enforcement apparatus during the Cultural Revolution was also accomplished through the wider use of mass line devices and the imposition of militarv control O\'er "Kung-chien-hi" by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).'" The courts still existed 2> Comrade Hsieh Fu-clueh Important Speah (excerpts), Canton Chiu-P'eng-Lo Chan-Po (Drag-out P'eng-Lo Combat ~ews). (:>io. 3, Feb. 1968 but functioned onlv sparingh·. There were occasional reports of panicipation of the people·, courts in the judicial process.'"' ~lore often there were reports of public judgment meetings or mass triab held against counterrevolutionaries, class enemies. or common criminals. where judgments were rendered and sanctions imposed by "political and legal organs,"" "organs of dictatorship, "
32 "re,·olutionarv committees,"33 "police-procurate-court organs"" or "military control committees.""' .-hailable evidence indicates that the PL\'s supervision of the administration of justice continued beyond 1969. lt was only hetween 1970 and 1973 that militar) control over law enforcement gradually receded. although the pace varied from region to region and from agency to agencv. For instance, public notices announcing s.entences against criminals were issued in 1971 by the militat") control committees of the PLA for the police, procUt·aty and courts BACKGROt:ND 124 (No. 852, 1968) in various path ol Yunn.1n pro\ in<<·.'"" 1111<· .ot reponed trial, in Pekmg anrl (..mton in 1 ~70. people's courts pa"ed \entence, .. , Publi< 'e<u-rin organs are 1 eported to ha\ e rtc,umed the it dutie' in 19il in lar!{e cuie,,'" hm t\\o dmuments, dated August 19/~ and \larch l!J/3, show that the Pl.A still exercised militJt' <on-trol over police in Yunnan. 39 In gener.tl. "normain" appeat·s to ha'e been restored to the legal field by l!Ji3. The courr-thu' appear to have survived the Cultural Re\!olution. Le" fortunate was the procurac'. "hich was abolished, its functions and p<J\,er' ha,·ing been transferred to the public securil\ agency.'" What has emerged from the Cultural Revolution is the ascendency of the societal model of law m·er the jural model and the more explicit dominance of the Part\ and the police in the administration of justice." In a larger context, the balancing of the l\\O competing lines-institutionalization and the mass ltne-is evident in the new Constitution adopted m (March 5, 1973) . Copies of both documents, which pronounced sentences upon a number of class enemies. are in the possession of the author. English translation of the first document is in Hungdah Chiu, IUPra note 27, at 108-10.
"'/d. at 91-92. According to Chinese spokesmen, the procuracy was abolished in order "to stmplify. improve and transform the superstructure which "·as not suitable to socialist economic basis. and to simplify the procedure in the jurisdictional sphere for the convenience of the masses." Ruge. An lntrniew with Chi>.,st Ltgal Off~eia/s, 1975 CHINA Q. 120 (~o. 61).
" For a comprehensive treatment of China's It-gal development in the post-1966 period. see a forthcoming study by Sh.w-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu.
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19i5! 2 On the one hand. the Constitution cont<~ins provisions weighted towanl discipline and orderly economic de,·elopment." On the other, it includes statements reflecting unequivocally :\lao Tse-tung"s mass politics and .mti-bureaucratism."
As far as law is concerned, the new Constitution clearlv confirms the political real it~ of the consistent decline of the jural model in China since 1957. There is a drastic reduction in the number of the provisions concerning citizens· fundamental rights, from 19 articles (Articles 85-103) in the 1954 Constitution to 4 articles (Articles 26-29) in the 1975 Constitution!• Even more dramatic is the reduction in the coverage of the judicial system, from 12 articles (Articles 73-84) in the old Constitution to one article (Article 25) in the present Constitution. Eliminated are provisions containing such "bourgeois" concepts of due process as equality before the law, public trials, right to defense, and protection against arbitrary arrest. .. Also dropped was the controversial provision providing for judicial independence." U nderscor-" (1975) .
43 E.g., Articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 on the economy and the last part of Article 13 referring to "both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness."
.. E.g., Article II stressing proletarian politics, the mass line, and the principle of efficient and simple administration; Article 13 permitting the masses "speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing big-character posters." It was reported that the inclusion of the freedom to strike in Article 28 was done at Mao Tse-tung's personal insistence. Chang Chun-chiao,supra note 3, at 39-40. ing the pre,·ailing trend trmard politicization and infurmalization of the legal order, Article 25 of the 1975 Constitution calb for the subjection of the people's court' to the control of local political leadership nhe rewJ!utionan committees) at corresponding le,·els and the application of the mass line as the operational principle for procuratorial and trial work!" It further legitimizes the dominant position of the police in law enforcement b' pro,·iding that "the functiom and powero; of procut·atorial organs are exercised bv the organs of public securitv at various levels." Despite the apparent.recision of many provisions of the 1954 Organic Law of the People's Courts by the currem Constitution, the fourlevel court structur·e and the t\\·o-trial system continue to function!• The role of the courts, nevertheless, is quite modest. :\ great many cases of anti-social behavior are handled by public security organs .. \n e,·en greater number of conflicts are resolved by basic-level administrative units and mass organizations. The courts appear to be involved only in serious criminal cases and divorce litigations.
As the extrajudicial process of law enforcement and dispute resolution now receives more emphasis than before the Cultural Revolution, it is important to idemify the major participants in the process. The basic level of gow·rnment 48 The first paragraph of Article 25 srates "The people's courts are responsible and accountable to the people's congress and their permanent organs at the corresponding levels. The Presidents of the people's courts are appointed and subject to removal by the permanent organs of the people's congTess at the corresponding levels." According to Article 22. the permanent organs of the people's congTesses at local levels are the local revolutionan committees which serve as the local government. is the street reH>Iutionarv commiuee in an urban area and the commune re,·oluuonar~ comminee in the countnside. Belm, the 'tree! revolurionarv commiuce are quasi-official re,idem' coiJrmin.:n, "hich .rre in turn suMi,·irl .. d into residents groups; below the commune revolutionarv commiuee are quasi-official production brigade commiuees, which are in turn subdivided into production team commiuees.
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Parallel to the administrati,·e strunure, both the Communist Panv and the public security apparatus are organized in hierarchies extending down to the lowest level. In addition, security protection commiuees, mediating committees, the Young Communist League, the Women's Association, and other activist networks are formed in residential, production and occupational units."
Under the overall direction of the Party, these official, quasi-official. and mass organi-.. Except for the sub-ritution of the revolutionarv committee as the local government (Article 22 of the Constitution), the basic-level admimstrative structure is essentiall) the same as that before the Cultural Revolution. mines. enterprises. and schools. The main tasks of these committees are to assist publit: securin· organs "fif't to conduct amung the masses propaganda-education to heighten their revolutionary consciousness, and to teach them in the ohsen·an<e of state policies and law~" ..1nd ··..,econdh· to organize the masse"' to guard a~J.in-,t counten C\olutionarie"'. enenn 'pecial zations .tre the prim;tn ex11 a-Judie t.ol ln\lllu-Jion\ seuling ci\tl dt,pute' and dispming of minor crimrnalca,e;. When conflict ari""· the informal resolution pron'" is conducted b' cadres and acti\1'1~ in 1hme basic-It-vel unil' along with friends, relati\e'>. neighbors, and co-workers of the parties lll\olved. From the outset, it mmt be determmed whether am given situation mvolvcs "antagonistic" or "nonantagonistic" contradicitom, as prescribed b~ Mao. 52 For instance, mediation and persuasion are employed by individuals or a small group to resolve disputes between neighbors or spouses. Struggle, criticism, and self-criticism before a group are used to deal with minor cases of misbehavior. such as gambling and peuy theft. Fot· more serious wrongdoings or repeat offenders. "administrative" sanctions, includmg detention and supenised or compulsory labor, are imposed by public security organs.""
The activities of extra-judicial units at the "grass roots" level take care of most of the civil disputes and minor criminal offenses. Only after the "exhau\tion of lm:al remedies" are a few civil disputes, usually divorce cases, referred to the courts, where mediation efforts are again undertaken, before there will be an agents, fire, and natural disaster>." Articles 2 and 18 of Chm-an pao-wez U'fi-VUllli hw kung-t.w h.li-tlf r 'hihhsing Ll'ao-an) [ ferentiates between ''contradictions between ourselves and the enemy" ~tnd "tontradictions among the people." English text of his speech can be found in Suppi£mmt to Peopl/.< Chma 3-27 (:-\o. I3, I957). The implications of this particular speech will be analyzed later in this article.
" The description of the mformal proces-of '"" enforcement and dispute resolution is based on emigre accounts and reports of visitors. For the latter, see Cohen, <upra note 50, at 43; Crockett, Cnminal justice rn Ch~t~a, 59 jL"DlCATL"RE 239 (I975). According to information from former cadres. the public securin organs can rmpose three tvpes of "labor sancuons": "supervised labor" in the old place of work with no fixed period, "compulsory labor" in a farm for t-.o or three )ears, .md "rehabilitation through lahar" in a designated camp for four to six years. Compare th" with the discu"iom inj. COHE", .1upra note 6, .ll 20-2I .tnd in Ch'iu K'ung-\·uan. 06 Ruge, supra note 49, at 121-22. Interviews with former cadres and residents in China indicate that in importa!1t cases of a political nature the public is usu:~lly given hrief. conclusory materials refering to the offe11ses as "viciously attacking socialism," "arousing the great anger of the masses," etc. As a rule, the people follow the guidance of these documents and party leaders in making suggestions about punishment at small group discussions. In less important cases, however, there appears to be more leeway for the people 10 express their views. One informant said that he was once saved from imprisonment for an alleged attempt to escape to Hong Kong by the strong defense of his innocence received from his co-workers in an organization. A recent report by foreign travellers in Sian described an unusual poster campaign conducted by "the masses" concerning an alleged case of rape. Apparently with official approval, the posters protesred to the Provincial Revolutionar> Committee of Shensi. the unjust condemnation of a young worker, named \\tang, to twenty years imprisonment for the "rape." Among other complaints, the posters said that the judicial authorities never consulted "the ma<ses," specifically the workers at WJng's factory. China'> 'Masse~' Hit Authorllie< Ovn Rapr Calf, The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 1976 , at AS, col. 2.
•• There were lrequent report' on mas< uials and Throughout the judicial process, the courts work closell· with the public security apparatus. 58 :\II important decisions, of course, ha1·e to be cleared with the re,·olutionary committees and Pa111 committees of corresponding levels-' 9 HoweYer, the judiciary does provide these decisions "·ith a stamp of legitima(\· and continues to pla1 a limited but useful role in the PRC's entire law enforcement framework.
CLASS :'I.'ATt;RE Of PEOPLE's jUSTICE
The cla-;s nature of law is an essential componenr of Communist jurisprudence, as evidenced by statements of Marx, Lenin and others.60 In the PRC, Mao Tse-tung also expounded the concept of class justice by saying, "Such state appar·aws as the army. the police and the courts are instruments with which one class oppresses another. As far as the hostile classes are concerned these are instruments of judgment-pronouncing rallies during and shortly after the Cultural Revolution. For mort> recent reports on the practice of mass trials. see T/o, Provincial Sance in China, China :>;ews Summary, May 12, 1976 (:'\o. 613)(Hong Kong), at I.
•• According to one source, members of the court and nf the public security bureau work together in a legal subcommittee appointed by the revolutionary committeee. Cheng Huan, Law in China, 4 FAR EAST-ERN EcoN. REv. 14 (1972). More often, it appears that judicial and police personnel coordinate their work informallv through close contacts. Visitors and emigres have seen the signs of the court and the public security organ hung in the same building. 
ters. when representatives of the veterans went to
the Higher Court to inquire about the lack of response to their written complaint, they were told that the complaint had been sent up to the Pro1·incial Party Committee for disposition since the court could not independently handle the case without the "Titten guidance of the Party Committee. 19i5 In the words of a Chinese jurist, the socialist law in Lhina is "a sharp weapon for carrying out class struggle in tht> hands of the broad masses of laboring people lt>d by the proletariat," used primarily to suppress the enemy, protect the revolutionary order, and insure the success of socialism .
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Using the class line approach, Mao provided a theoretical framework for differentiating and resolving social conflicts with his famous 195i speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." In the speech, he drew a basic distinction between two types of contradictions: "Contradictions between ourselves and the enemy" (antagonistic contradictions) and "contradictions among the pe"ple" (non-antagonistic contradictions). Mao defined in broad terms "the people" as "the classes, strata, and social groups which appro\e, support and work for the cause of socialist construction" and "the enemy" as "the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution, and are hostile and try to wreck socialist construction _,. 63 As the two contradictions are fundamentally different, the methods for solving them also differ. According to Mao, conflicts among the people are to be dealt with by the "method of democracy" and conflicts with the enemy by the "method of dictatorship." In settling "questions between right and wrong among the people," reliance should be placed on education and persuasion. In dealing with "reactionaries, exploiters, counterrevolutionaries, landlords, bureaucrats, capitalists, robbers, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, hooligans, and other scoundrels who seriously disrupt social order," measures of dictatorship and severe sanctions must be employed ...
• .. According to Mao Tse-tung, the term "the people" has different meanings in different countries and in different historical periods in each country. In 1957 "the people" he referred to included the workers, peasants, peuy bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Mao, On tht Corrtct Hand/rag of Contradirlioru, 1upra note 52, at 3-4. However, the bourgeoisie has since been dropped from "the people." The 1975 constitution only mentions the workers, peasants, and non-agricultural individual laborers in the Chinese hody politic (Articles I and 5). Article 14 nl the Constitution also deprives the political rights nf rhe following enemy groups: "the landlords. rich peasants, reactionan· capitalists. and other bart dements." ·~ A. BARNETt. supra note 22, at 404. 68 In a violent dispute involving forty-odd men in the outskirts of Canton in late 1955. the public securit} cadres singled out one man who had a .. counterrevolutionary" hlstory for prosecution. He was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to five years of reform through labor. J. CoHEN. supra note 6. at 511-12. Similar cases of this nature have been reported by re<:ent emigres. In one adulten· case nuurring in Amo~ in 1971. the man was a factoq worker and the woman's father was a former K:\IT official.
cal campaign when members of the "black elements" often pro\'ide con\'eniem targets for class hostility and abuse.•• On the other hand, persons of good class background are reponed to ha,·e received leniem treatment e\'en in serious cases such as rape.
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The strong class character of Chinese criminal law is clearly stated in an official textbook. "The criminal law of our country primarily deals blows to the coumerre\'olutionaries, to the criminals of homicide, arson, burglary. fraud, rape, and other offenses seriously ob· structing social order and socialist construction.
It must be understood that the poim of our criminal law is chiefly directed toward the enemies of socialism ."
71 Consequently, when case materials are disseminated among the public for discussion, they outline, among other things, the nature and gravity of the offense, Because of different class backgrounds, he was sentenced to one year of imprisonment while she rc· ceived a two-year prison term.
" I! is during political campaigns that many persons are either classified for the first time or "capped" again as members of the "five black elements ... It is also in political campaigns that harsh sanctions against class enemies are used and publicized to serve the purpose of "killing chickens to scare monkeys. 10 Two cases based on interviews may be cited here as illustrations. In a 1958 case that occurred in a village near Canton, a militiaman unsuccessfully at· tempted to rape a landlord's daughter and beat the father up rather badly. The public security station chief did not want to punish a "good person" such as the militiaman for misconduct toward a "bad person" surh as a landlord. Consequently, the militiaman was sent to rehabilitation through labor instead of being sentenced to five to seven years in prison. J. CoHEN. supra note 6. at 26tHi7. In a 1961 case occurring in Enp'ing County. Kwangtung. a militiaman raped a former landlord's wife at gun point and claimed that she had seduced him. E,·en after the true facts were established. the case "as categorized as a "contradiction within the people" and no serious punishment was meted out to the wrongdoer. Shinichino .. the social ongm of the offender. his personal background. class stand, and political altitude and motivation. :'.iembers of small discussion groups in\'ariably follow the tone of the distributed documents and use 1 he class line as the criterion to suggest punishment. If in doubt, they ah,·ays find it prudent to take the position of the left rather than the right.
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Political considerations are not only applied to the sanctioning process in the PRC. E\'en in dealing "·ith a civil dispute, a firm class ,·iew-point is also required'' The concept of equality before the law for all persons certainly has no place in people's justice. Those few Chinese leaders in fa\'or of such a bourgeois concept ha\'e been severely attacked by the Maoists.
Class and class 'truggle is a great revolutionar} magic weapon of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung ... However, the handful of top capitalist roaders within the Part\· vainlv auempted to wipe out fundamentally the dictatorship of the proletariat hy means of law ..
Counterrevolutionary revisionist p·eng Chen
even openly jumped forth to set the tune saying: "All citizens of ours can become equal and must be equal before the law ... He advocated "equal tceatment" and stated that "there is no need to adopt a class viewpoint in addition to law." He rejected the class character of law, thus over· throwing the proletarian dictatorship. In this \\ay, the public security organs, procur~horates, law courts and armed forces became ordinary organs instead of instruments of the dictator· ship. The question of who should be defended or suppressed was obliterated at one stroke, and with no diyiding line drawn between the enemy and ourselves. how could revolution be carried out? If such peaceful evolution were permitted to go on. our proletarian regime would not take long to end in capitalist restora· tion. 13 LENG, supra note 6, at 174. For a discussion of politicization of dispute resolution, see Lubman . .mpra note 8. at 1339-46. "ComplEtely Sma.1h thr Frodal, (; apllalut and Rt'VI· 'iomsl Legal Sy<trm. >upra note 2, at 23-24. C mil hi' ouster during the Cultural Revolution, P'eng Chen It should be noted. howe\er. that the tla" line " not a rigid but a flexible tool of the Party. According to :I. lao Tse-tung, a person\ cla;s status is not onlv determined b' his sonal oriKin and cia" batkground hut, more importaml~. b' his political attitudes and heha,ior.
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Consequent!\, a serious de.-iant act can c.Iuse the lhange ol an mdividual's label from ,t member of the people to the categon of the enemv. B\ the same token. it is at least technical!\ feasible for a member of the "fiye (black) elements" to be elevated to the categor,· of the people through evidence of good conduct and ideological transformation.
In fact, the Communist authorities in China have occasionally taken a relatively "soft" stand toward the political outcasts and their relatives by giving them some hope of changing their class status. This tactic is in line with ~lao's tealhing of "winning over the majority and opposinK the minoritY."'" At times, law enforcement cadres have publicized the following policy line:
Class background is a very important criterion
but not the sole determmant for treatment; emphasis must be placed on political performance. :\!embers of the "five (black) elements" Jre told to reform themselves and establish merits so they can be "uncapped" and have their class status changed 77 Special appeal is often directed to the children of the "five (black) elements," who are urged to dra" a sharp demarcation between themselves and their reactionary families and to come to the side of the revolution.'" Some was the mayor of Peking and a close associate of Liu Shao-ch'i.
" For a discusston of the question of class in Mao Tse-tung's thought. see B. SCHWARTZ, CoMMl'NISM AND CHt,A: IDEOLoGY r,; Fu; x (1968) and Starr, AstA" SuRvEY 620 (1971) . 76 This is an often-quoted ~aoist dictum to isolate and annihilate the enemv. ~ao stated in 1962 and again in 1967 that the "five bad elements" onl} constituted five percent of the Chinese population. :\lAO TsE-n·,;c SSl'-HSIA,;G w•"·Stl' (Long li•·e :\lao Tse-tung's Thought) 419, 666 ( 1969) . Two concepts have conditioned the Chinese perception ol the role ol law m their revolunonaq "heme. One i' the \farxist-Lenist theon that considers law as a political tool to implement Part\ polic,· •• The other is Mao's idea of "uninterrupted re\'olution" that called for a continuous effort to mold and remold human nature."' These two conceptions have combined to provide the Chinese elites with a theoretical framework to view law as an instrument of social engineering, to be used for the transformation of Chinese sociel\ and its members in accordance with the revolutionary ideology. Either in a formal or informal style, law is seen as an important agent of political socialization and mobilization to inl ukatc the people with the new soctalist morality. Consequently, there has been much stress in the PRC on the educational functions of the courts, popular participation in rule enforcement, reformative aspects of penal policy, and flexibility rather than rigidity in the application of law_ Despite the Chinese emphasis on the informality of law, a large body of substantive laws ,md regulations have been promulgated by the PRC. 82 Many of them have been concerned with the implementation of the Communist elites' policy of systemic transformation. For instance, the Land Reform Law <tnd the Marriage Law were enacted in 1950 to change fundamentally China's land and family sys-'• As reported by several former cad res. 80 Lenin said: "Law is a political instrument. It is politics." J. HAZARD, mpra note 60, at 69.
•• For relevant discussion of Mao's theory of continuous (uninterrupted) revolution and his belief in the malleability of human nature, see Schram, Mao Ts--tung and th' Theory of Pmnanrol Rroolullon, 1958 -1969 , 1971 (1971) .
•• Relevant laws and regulations can be found in the two statutory collections cited at supra, note 82. See also a special collection: Szu-YING KUNG-SHENC.-
YEH Tl SHE-Hlll CHU-1 KAI-TSAO CHENC-TSE FA-LING
HSUAN-PIEN (Selections of policies, laws, and regulations concerning the socialist transformation of privately-owned industry and commerce) (1957) .
.. E.g., the Act for Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries (1951) , the Provisional Act for Punishment of Crimes That Endanger State Currency (1951) , the Act for Punishment of Corruption ( 1952) , and the Security Administration Punishment Act (1957) . 88 A useful collection of official documents on the Cultural Revolution is UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE. CCP DocuMEsTs oF THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CuL-TURAL REVOLJ.: TION, 1966 TION, -1967 TION, (1968 to folio"· Chairman :\lao's instruction to protect the great achievements of the Cultural Revolution, to strike against a handful of counterre,·olutionan and other criminal elemems. and to comolidate the dictator,hip of the proletariat.
•• The educational function of the judiciarv is also realized through such mass line device;. as bring"ing-the courts to the people and distributing ca~e materials for small group discussions. According to one witness, following a trial helcl at a fanon concerning the stealing of goods lw a worker. the two hundred coworkers present said that "they had been educated regarding the struggle against their corruption hv bourgeois ideas, and raised their understanding of the two lines and revisionism."90 Likewise, in handling civil disputes, mostlv divorce cases, the courts conduct propaganda and education among both the parties involved and the public at large. The overriding objectives are to settle internal contradictions by mediation, to uphold law and discipline. to strengthen the unity of the people. and to promote the development of socialist virtues.
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Educational functions are generally performed by the societal model of Ia"· and by the entire political-legal socialization process. Discussed above was popular participation in the extra-judicial activities of law enforcement and dispute resolution at the "grass roots" level. In addition, it should be noted that laws, policies, and other norms are usually communicated to and internalized by the people through the media, schools, and study sessions of small groups organized on the basis of residence or work." 2 Subjects of study sessions vary from 89 Statutes are interpreted to the public by cadres according to the policy demands of the day. The Marriage Lav,· of 1950, lor mstam e, remains effective today and is frequently cited in divorce judgments."" Yet its provision on the marrialo(eable age {20 years of age for the man and 18 for the woman) has been modified by the Party policy favoring late marriage. Article 4 of the Marriage Law notwithstanding, marriage is now generall} discouraged for men below thirty and for women below twenty-five vears of age ." 13 Chinese text and its English translation are in II ISSUES AND STUDIES 77-84 (No.3, 1975) .
•• A copy of the document is in the author's possesliion .
.. Su note 51 supra. 96 In a judgment rendered on !\larch 22, 1973 [Fatzu (73) :o-;o. I], the People's Court ofSwatow, Kwangtung, stated that it had followed the spirit of Articles 8, 17 and 20 of the Marriage Law to decide on the granting of dimrce, property arrangements and custody of the children. In another divorce judgment rendered on May 23, 1974 [Mm-tzu (74) I he ronrept nf !,11, ,1, .111 m'trurnent of eduration .tnd ideologiral indoctr tn;ttton I' al"' manifested in the ernpha,is placed on thought refm m b' PRC pen.tlmea,ures. PeJ..mg·, puliu of comhimng lenienn 11ith pumshment and reform through labor 11ith education has it' origin in the vean of Ktang't and Yenan" 8 it' r hcurettL.d ba,is .tgam has been prov·ided fJ\ the writings of \lao Tse-tung. In a 1934 report 10 the Second So\iet Congress, \lao stre'Sed tht> educational functions of the labor reform institutions in the Kiangsi Sovier. 99 Writing On People'., Democratic Dictatonhzp in 1949, he promised that members of reactionan cla"e' who gave up counterrevolutionarv acti,·ities \\oulcl he granted the opportunity to \\ork and to relorm themselves through labor so as to become new men 100 In .1 report on "the ten majm relationships" in 1956, he emphasized the reform through labor rather than execution of counterrevolutionaries, in ordet to Lorn en "worthless things into useful ones" and to avoid making "irretrievable mistakes."
101 Discussing how to deal with the enemv in his 195i speech on contradictions, ~lao suggested that the method of dictatorship be usee! to compel them to obev the law of the people's government and to engage in labor and. through labor, transform themselves into ne" men w
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There is a hierarchv of sanctions in the PRC that puts offenders through the reform process. For lesser offenses, individuals may he plared under "control" or sentenced to performing "supervised labor" at the place of residence or work. For more serious crime,, offenders mav be sent to camps to undergo rehabilitation through labor or reform through labor. The last two sanctions are governed b~ the following two major statutes: 
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The principal aim of the corrective measures, according to Chinese spokesmen, is reeducation rather than punishment. Physical labor is an important part of the reform process, be-~ cause it eliminates 1 he criminal's reactionarv ideology of the exploiting class and enableshim to learn productive skills to meet the needs of the society .
10 ' Devices for ideological reform include self-criticism and criticism in group meetings, preparation of lengthy written confessions, and exposure and denunciation of others' wrongdoings. Political education is also conducted in study sessions wherebv the offenders learn about Marxism-Leninism. the thought of Mao Tse-tung, state laws, Party policies, and current affairs.' 05 In the end, each individual is evaluated on the basis of his work performance. sincerity in repentance, diligence in study, and responsiveness to reform.'06 A system of rewards and sanctions is through labor is an "administrative" sanction while reform through labor (for all imprisonment) is a "criminal" and harsher sanction. For details as well as some translated statutes, see CoHEN. supra note 6, chs. IV and XI. 104 Statements by Chinese jurists to recent Western visitors can be found in Ruge, supra note 49. at 122 and in R. Brown, Law in Present Day China 12-13 (unpublished manuscript, 1975) . Su also ~!eng ChaoLiang, The Basic Situation in Reform Through Labor Work itt the Last Nine Years, C.F.Y.C. 66 (~o. 5, 1958) . A recent study by an American scholar indicates that the primary activity in corrective labor camps is labor in terms of time. Whyte, Corrective Labor Camps in China, 13 ASIAN SURVEY 253-69 (1973) . Although beyond the scope of this article, one should not overlook the economic contribution of the compulsory labor systems to the construction of China's public works and development projects.
'" Meng Chao-liang, supra note 104, at 67-68; Whyte, supra note 104, at 260-61. 106 See, for example, Articles 68 and 69 of the 1954 Act for Reform through Labor. In a document issued in 1970 by the People's Security Group of the Yunnan Provincial Revolutionary Committee, the following criteria were used to evaluate the "fi,·e (bad) elements" under "control": (I) Whether they had used the thought of Mao Tse-tung to reform their thought; (2) Whether the>· had actively participated in productive labor to reform themselves; (3) Whether they had faithfully obeyed state laws and regulations and accepted the supervision of the mass; and (4) Whether they had been courageous to expose used to influence individual behavior. The guiding principle is always "lenienc~ to those who confess (cooperate) and se,·erity to those who resist." '"' It is difficult to make a conclusive appraisal of Chinese corrective institutions. On the one hand, there have been enthusiastic claims of the humanitarian concern for the successful transformation of the criminals. 108 On the other hand, charges of cruelty and exploitation have been made against the Chinese svstem of "force labor."'"" One thing, however, seems clear: under \lao's guidance the PRC has developed elaborate thought reform techniques applicable to labor camps as well as so~iety at large in an effort to transform human nature and to secure the general acceptance of goals and norms of the socialist system."" 111 Recent re,elations have confirmed the view previously held by analysts that the campaign was not a mere academi( debate but a manifestation of factional and policy contlicts \\ithin the Pan' leader,hip.'" The "radicals" initially launched the anti-Confucian campaign in an implicit \et unmistakable attack against Chou En-lai and his bureaucr.tti< associates for their retreat from the Cultural Revolution and the rehabilitation of mam purged officials, but the "moderate'' subsequently succeeded in transforming the target of the campaign by linking ami-Confucianism with the movement against Lin Piao.
'
Throughout the campaign the two groups manipulated historical figures and events to advance their respective policy lines. The "moderates" expounded the themes of stability. unity, institutionalization, and economic development, while the "radicals" argued for struggle and reform and argued against "the tide" and the Confucian-type "retrogression and restoration."
111 The "radicals" attacked Teng Hsiao-ping and his associates for sabotaging the campaign. Su, t.g., Ting Liang, Why Did Trog Hsiao-pmg lgnurt the Strugg{, betwN•n Confucianism and Ltgalum, Hung-chi (Red Flag), (No. 10, 1976) . at 64-65.
112 Two of the representative analytical articles on the campaign are Goldman. Clunr. 's Anti-Confucian Campmgn, 1971 -74, 1975 CHINA Q. 435 (No. 63) and Chang. Tht Anti-Lm Piao and Confunw Campaign: Its .\.ftaning and Purpose, 14 ASIAN SURVEY 871-86 (1974 . For detailed work on the subject, see WANG HsuEH- POLITICS (1975) . 113 In the current campaign against the "gang of four" (Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hung-wen), PRC spokesmen accused the "radical" leaders and their supporters (those writing in the names of Liang Hsiao, Lo Szuting, etc.) of undermining the campaign through the following distortions: they claimed the continuation of the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism up to the present even within the Party is an open effort to tamper with the nature and program of the CCP; they used the criticism of Confucius to direct attack first on Chou En-lai and later on Hua Kuofeng; they flaunted the banner of publicizing Legalism to embellish themselves in an attempt to usurp Party and state power; they glorified Empress Lu and Tse-tien for the purpu.e of making Chiang Ching China's empress of the 20th century. One intriguing a'pect of the camp;Iign "·" its pro-Legalist position. In order to aS'<'" the possible implications for the role of law in contemporan Chin..t, we shall examine bnt'fh what areas of Legali'm and "h1eh l.eg,IIi't figures received special attention in tht ' campaign.114 In contrast to the "reactioti..tr}" feature' of Confucianism, Chinese writers in the campaign praised Legalism because of its stanrl for progress and reform, for law and order, for economic and scientific development, and for unification and centralization .
WEN. LEGALISM AND ANTI-CONFUC.IANISM IN MAOISI
115 Thus, Shang Yang and Han Fei of the Legalist school were pictured as representing the ideology of the newly rising landlord class during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period. Their outlook was innovative and progressive, and the contention between them ;md the Confucians, "representative of the declining slaveowning class," was said to reflect a struggle between two lines of thought: "whether to promote the development of the new system, or to try to preserve the old system; whether to serve the needs of the newly rising class in accordance with historical development, or try to turn history back by following the examples of 'former sage-kings'; whether to advocate the rule of 'law' suited 10 the development of the new age, or stubbornly try to presene the socalled rule of 'rites' in the old sy,tem."
116 According to this theme, the struggle continued throughout Chinese history. In the Han dynasty it was between the materialist theory of knowledge represented by Wang Chung and the idealist apriorism preached by Tung Chung-shu.' 17 During the Sung dynasty, it was between the reformists headed by Wang Anshih and the "diehard big landlord ruling 114 A detailed examination of these issues will he presented in a paper by the author at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in March 1977. 115 In a popular book prepared by the Peking University, all these points except "law and order" were mentioned in its concluding observation.. jt·-FA TOIJ·CHENG SHIH KAt-KUANG (A general survey of the history of the struggle between Confuciamsm and Legalism) 144-45 (1975 dique" 1·epresented bv S~u-ma Kuang and other Confucianists."" The Legalists' stand for "rule by law·· received considerable acclaim from PRC authors. Shang Yang was cited for the statement that "punishment should be extended to all ranks of people," a statement inte1·preted as an actual criticism of the Confucian view that "punishment should not be extended to anyone in the rank of ta fu (senior officials) or higher." 119 When Shang Yang's laws of reform, including group responsibility for a member's guilt, were violated, the offenders were severely punished . 120 As a result, "it is recorded that after the new laws 'had been enforced for ten years, the people of Chin were very happy.' 'order prevailed in town and countryside,' and 'even women and children talked about Shang Yang's laws.'" A bourgeois revolutionary, Chang Taiyen was quoted as saying: "The World sees only the severity of Shang Yang's new law without considering its posltlve consequences."121 Han Fei was also praised for establishing laws and institutions to benefit the common people, because under the rule by law "high officials are not exempt from punishment for crimes while the common people are not denied rewards for good deeds. " 122 His advocacy of "severe punishment and harsh laws" was justified on his belief that, "if the law enforcement officers are firm, the country will be powerful. If they are weak, the country will be weak, too. Special emphasis in the campaign was placed on the concepts of unification and centralization advanced by the Legalists. Han Fei, for instance. was one of those credited with the development of the theory of "rule by law" on which to establish a centralized feudal state. From his examination of historical experience, Han Fei arrived at the conclusion that only by strengthening the "rule by law" (appointing officers according 10 abilitv, bestowing titles according to merits, etc.) could the ruler expect to build a rich and strong country, consolidate a centralized political system, and suppress the "restoration activities" of the slave-owning aristocracy.128
The In the literature published during the campaign Ch'in Shih Huang was presented as a strong and progressive ruler with several positive achievements.'
31 He unified China, by successfully conquering the :.ix other states and building a unitary state. He established centralized authority, accomplished through the abrogation of the ducal state institutions, adoption of the prefecture-county system, and creation of an elaborate bureaucracy centered around the Emperor. He instituted reforms by introducing a uniform monetary system, standardizing weights, measures, vehicles, and the written language, and constructing postroads and canals. These were applauded as Ch'in Shih Huang's significant reform measures designed to promote economic and cultural development and consolidate the unification of the country. Finally. he suppressed the "restoration" movement. The laws of Ch'in were called an important weapon of the dictatorship over the slave-owning aristocratic class. Fallowing the Legalist doctrine, the First Emperor :'\.C.:'\.A., June 5, 1974 ad\o<.ated the use of laws and dn ret:' a> teadzing material and officials as teachers.
132 Hts policy of "burning books and bun mg Confucian s<:holars alive" was defended as progressi\·e and necessar) in that it strengthened the centralized power by striking a severe blow at the restoration acti,ities of the reactionaries who "used the past to oppose the pre~ent."
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There i~ little duubt that the campaign to criticize Confucianism and to praise Legalism was basically political in nature. Historical figures and issues were manipulated to support present leaders and policies. Intentionally or not, the Legalists' advocan of ··rule by law" was given a great deal of attention. Despite official explanations to the contran·, such Legalist concepts as "fixed and promulgated laws'' and "equality before the Ia"" appear to be at variance with the PRC's current practice .' 34 As a result of the campaign, original works of the Legalists in complete texts or in excerpts 132 Han Fei once said, "In the stare of the intelligent ruler, there is no literature of hooks and records, but the laws serve as teachings. There are no sayings of the former kings, but the officials act as teachers." HAN FEr Tzu, ch. 49. 133 It was pointed out that only a small number of reactionary scholars were killed and that books of a technical nature were exempted from destruction. Lo Szu-ting, Struggle be/U'een Restoratzon and CountnRestoration, >upra What was Ch'in Shih Huang anywav~ He onh buried four hundred and sixty scholars alive. We have buried forty-six thousand scholars alive. In our suppression of counterrevolutionaries, haven't we killed some reactionary intellectuals? I have argued with Democratic personnel: "You accuse us of being Ch'in Shih Huang. That is not right. We have surpassed Ch'in Shih Huang hundredfold. You curse us for being Ch'in Shih Huang, for being dictators. That we have always admitted. The pity is that you have not said enough, and we have found it necessary to make supplements.'' (roaring laughter) MAo TsE-TUNG ssv-HsrAsG WAN scr 195 (1969) . 134 Some writers tried to reconcile the Legalist concepts with those of the present regime. One said that the laws of Ch'in Shih Huang meant not only the laws and regulation> he promulgated but abo all his political. economic. and cultural policies and decisions. Kung Cheng, .IUpra note 129, at 120. Another said, "although the Legalists called their 'Law' 'public justice' and advo•:ated puni,hment without regard to clas~es. their Ia'' actually wa~ the manife'\-tation of the class will of the newh-emerging landlord cia"." Chu I-ring, 1upra note 124, ar Y2. have become a\·ailable to the public. This. along "·ith the campaign literature, ma~ haw a farreaching implication in the long run: the de\·el-opment of a greater respect for formal Ia"·' and procedures in the PRC.
Co:-;cu.:siO:..:S ASD Ft:Tt;RE PROSPECTS From our discussion. we may conclude that the com·entional approach of focusing on formal legal institlllions is inadequate for understanding the legal system of the PRC. Chinese law must be examined in terms of both of ib models (formal and informal) and from the perspective of its broad social functions in the context of China's revolutionary and developmental experience. What also appears clear is the strong impact on the Chinese legal development made by Mao Tse-tung, especially his skepticism about bureaucratization, his prefererence for the mass line, and his commitment to the concept of "uninterrupted revolution." Mao's influence is reflected in the PRC's emphasis on the societal model of law over the jural model, on llexibility rathe•· than "rigidity" in the application of law, on the politicization of the entire legal process, and on the use of law as an instrument of social engineering to transform Chinese society as well as its members.
Despite Mao's dominant influence, however, there has been an undercurrent running toward more stable and regularized legal order. This was expressed by the intellectuals during the 1957 Hundred Flowers Campaign. In Canton wall posters displayed in late 1974, this undercurrent was manifested in the demands on the authorities to observe the law and protect the people's constitutional rights.
135 Furthermore, some members of the Communist elites seem to have differed with Mao over the role of law. Purged leaders such as Liu Shaoch'i and P'eng Chen were denounced for their advocacy of the bourgeois legal system. Even Chou En-lai and Tung Pi-wu made occasional pleas for codification and regularization. l n his 130 In a poster appearing at the end of 1974. a group of demobilized veterans made such demands on the provincial authnrities of Kwangtung. :\fts<: PAo :\losTHLY 99 (:>;o. 112, 1975 136 During the movement against Confucianism, ~hou's supporters apparently used the praise of Legalism to advance the themes of institutionalization and rule by law.
The passing of :1-lao from the scene has created a new situation in China. While the late Chairmat~ continues to be quoted as a source of legitimaq, changes in the direction of Chinese political-legal patterns can be expected. :\!ready, the "radical" elements are being purged, and Chou En-lai's plan for modernization and nationalization is emerging as state pol in·."" The swing toward institutionalization. specialization, and economic development (including foreign trade) is bound to affen the role of law in the PRC. Given the unique background and experience of the Chinese revolution and development, it is quite likely that many features of people's justice will remain relatively unchanged in the years to come. On the other hand, it is likely that in the future the jural model may achieve some parity with the societal model of law in China and that legal work may regain the kind of respectabilitv it once enjoyed during the mid-1950's. CosGRESS, Htpra note 3, c,t 63-64. 137 For instance. in a speech on December 25. 19i6, Hua Kuo-feng said that "we must follow the policy of building our country and running all our enter· prise' diligently ann thriftily, rely on the masse>. 'iystenw.tize national rules and regulations, and itnprove and .;;trengthen sociali~t economic management.
